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SOCIAL SECURITYAND MEDICARE POLICY
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTING
ABS TRACT
Ourprevious study (Auerbaoh, Gokhale and Kotlikoff 1991)
introduced the concept of generational accounting, a method of
determining how the burden of fiscal policy falls on different
generations. it found that fiscal policy in the U.S. is out of
balance, in terms of projected generational burdens. This meansthat
either current generations will bear a larger share (than we project
under current law) of the burden of the government's spending or that
future generations will have to pay, on average, at leaat 21 percent
more, on a growth-adjusted basis, than will those generations who have
juat been born.
These conclusions were based on relatively optimistic assumptions
about the path of social security sod Medicare policies, namely that
the accumulation of a social security trust fund would continue and
that Medicsre costs would not rise as a share of QP. In this paper,
we simulate the effects of realistic alternative paths for soCiel
security and Medicare. Our results suggest that such alternative
policies could greatly increase the imbalance in generational policy,
making not only future generations pay significantly more, but current
young Americans as well. For example, continued expansion of Medicare
in thisdecade alone could double the 21 percent imbalance figure if
thebillfor this Medicare growth is shifted primarily to future
generations.
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Department of Economics Federal Reserve Board
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Recent years have witnessed a growing skepticism about the use of rhe
fiscal deficit to gauge the stance of economic policy. Many economists as
well as noneconomists are questioning whether a single number, that relates
primarily to the government's current nash flow is the kind of measure needed
to understand the longer tens effects of fiscal policy on saving, investment,
end growth. They also ask whether the deficit can tell us how we are treating
different generations, both those currently alive and those yet to come.
Doubts about the deficit have been accentuated by the aging of the U.S.
population, with its ettandaot increase in the number of retireea dependent on
workers for pay—as—you—go spending and transfer programs.
in recognition of these concerns about the demographic transition, the
U.S. federal government began, in 1983, to accumulate a large social security
trust fund to help finance the "baby boom" generation's social security
benefits. But this break with short—term pay—as—you—go financing also raised
new questions about uaing the unified federal deficit, which includes social
security, as a measure of fiacal policy. If funds for the future need to be
accumulated by the social security system, then shouldn't such accumulations
be excluded from the overall deficit measure? The federal government's
response, as expressed in the 1990 budget agreement, has been to exclude
social security from future calculations of the deficit. However, this has
not prevented public discuasion of the deficit inclusive of social security.
Nor has it put to rest the concern that government spending is now larger and
will continue to be larger and that taxes are now smaller and will continue to
be smaller than they would In the absence of the social security surpluses,
ic, ,ithas not put to rest the concern that the federal government is"using" the large pay—as—you—go social security surpluses to offset large on—
budget deficits.
This is but one example of the ambiguity 0f the deficit and the
deficiency of any single deficit measure as a gauge of the fiscal burden faced
by different generations. While one response to this deficiency has been to
construct different deficits for different porpoaes, such constructs are
clearly ad hoc in nature and require cootinuai 'refinements" to prevent
perverse results. For example, if the social security system is excluded from
the budget for deficit purposes, how does one deal with changes in income
taxes that are induced by changes in social security taxes: should such
changes in off—budget taxes he permitted to alter the on—budget deficit?
The key economic question associated with fiscal deficits is: Which
generation will pay for what the government spends. However, no version of
the government's budget deficit provides this information. As we discuss
below, an increase in the deficit does not necessarily signal a shift in the
fiscal burden to future generations. Moreover, policies which dramatically
alter the intergenerational distribution of fiscal burdens may do so without
inducing any change whatsoever in the measured deficit.
In an earlier paper (Auerbsch, Gokhale and Kotlikoff, hereafter ACK,
1991), we developed an alternative to the deficit —generationalaccounting —
andshowed how this new approach could be used to ossess fiscal policy and its
distributional impact with respect to different generationa. Our previous
analysis stressed that generational accounts are quite informative shoot the
effects of changes in tax and transfer policies on the burdens of different
generations. This paper uses generational accounting to analyze potential
changes in the federal government's most important transfer program, the Old
Age Survivors, Disability and Health Insurance (OASDHI), which includes theold—age Social Security pension system end Kedicare. This component of the
federal budget has grown much more tepidly than other components in recent
years. If current trends continue, OASDHI will continue tc grow relative to
the economy due to the increasing share of the elderly in the population and
the rapid increase in real medical costs.
Before turning to such policy analysis, we briefly review the
generational accounting methodology, which is discussed more fully in AGE
(1991, 1992).
II. The Generational Accounting Approach
The basic idea behind generational accounting is that generations
currently alive end those yet to be born must pay for the time—path of the
government's expenditures on goods and services less the external resources
the government has to cover these expenditures (its net wealth). This, in
words, is the government's intertesporal budget constraint. The constraint
reminds us of the zero—sum nature of paying for the government's expenditures;
if generations. currently alive pay less, generations yet to come will be
forced to pay sore. It also reminds us that changes in fiscal policy today
are likely to necessitate changes in the future. We express the government's
intertemporal budget constraint in present value, with the initial value of
government liabilities and the present value of future spending hcing equal to
the sum of the present values of each generation's burden. Emphasizing the
prescnt value burdons of different generations, regardless of the year in
which such burdens are isposed, neutralizes the timing problems inherent in
annual deficit measures, and allows us to sunusarize in a conpact form the
likely effects of fiscal policy on individuals through time.—4—
The analysis is forward—looking, in that it calculates only the future
fiscal burdens that each generation faces. Because we ate interested in the
issue of generational imbalance in fiscal policy, we treat current and future
generations separately when analyzing a particular fiacal policy path. For
current generations, we calculate the burden under the particular fiscal
scenarioFor future generations, we calculate the total preseut value of
payments required to balance the government's intertemporal budget constraint.
One cannot say how this aggregate burden on future generations will be
distributed across these future generations. For purposes of illustrating the
size of the burden likely to be imposed on future generations relative to that
likely to he imposed on current generations, we assume that the burden on each
successive future generation remains fixed as a fraction of the lifetime
income of that generaticn; that is, the absolute fiscal burden of successive
generations grows at the rate of growth of their lifetime incomes, which we
take to be the rate of growth of productivity.
To calculate the burden faced by a member of an existing generation, vs
first project the net paynents to the government in each future year for a
representative member of that generation (distinguishing males and feitales)
and then take the present value of such payments. Ey net payments we mean all
taxes paid to, less all transfers received from, government at the federal,
state and local levels. Payments include not only direct taxes such as incceis
and property taxes, but also indirect business taxes, corporate taxes and
seignorage. Transfers include Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Social
Security Benefits, and so on. .4
Thepresent value calculation for each representative individual
discounts future payments not only for interest, bur alsn mortality: an
individual's future burden Is reduced by the probability that he or she willnot be alive when that burden occurs Given our assumption that members of
each generation (distinguished only by sex) face the same survival
•
probabilitiea, multiplying individual payments in each year by the
generation's projected surviving population for that year provides a measure
of that generation's payment, the separate components of which are benchmarked
to aggregates from the bational Income and Product Accounts.
Once burdens for current generations have been calculated, those faced by
future generations are estimated as a tesidual, based on the iiscal balance
requirement and the assumption that the remaining fiscal burden be borne
proportionally. Policy changes affect the projected net payments faced by
current ganerationa and, through the fiscal balance requirement, the burden on
future generations aa well.
Because the accounts are forward—looking, they don't consider the net
payments made in the past. The present value of future-net payments, which
are positive for young and middle—aged existing generations, are negative for
older generations, who are largely retired and facing lower labor income taxes
while at the same time receiving social security benefits and Medicare. Thus,
the level of an existing generation's account does not indicate how well or
poorly that generation has fared at the hands of the governzseot. We thetefore
focus on the changes in each generation's account that are induced by
alternative policies.
III. Construction of Generational Accounts
The construction of generational accounts is a two—step process. The
first step entails projectiog each currently living generation's average taxes
less transfers in each future year during which at least some members of the
generation will be alive. The aecnnd step converte these projected averagenet tax payments into a present value using an assumed discount rate and
taking into account the probability that the generations' members will be
alive in each of the future years (i.e. actuarial discounting for both
mortality and interest).
in projecting each currently living generation's taxea and tranafers, we
considor first their taxes and transiers in the base year, in this case, 1989.
The totala of the different taxea and transfers in the base year are those
reported by the National Income and Product Accounts. As described in detail
in ACE (1991), these totals of base year taxes and transfers are distributed
to the different generations according to their ages and sexes based on cross—
section survey data. These data include the Bureau of the Census' Survey cf
Income and Plan Participation and the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Survey of
Consumer Expenditures. The distribution of future taxes and ttanafers by age
and sex is assumed to equal that in the current year with adjustments for
growth and projected changes in policy.
Since the government already forecasts the totals cf its various taxes
and transfers for many yeats ahead, the sdditional work involved in
generational accounting is primarily in allocating these projected totals by
age and sex. Thus, although there are a few additional elements and the
requisite projections extend further into the iuture, generational accounting
uses mostly the same numbers the government uses only in a different manner.
The calculations presented here assume a 6.00 percent real tate of
discount and a productivity growth rate of .75 percent. The tate of
productivity growth is based on recent 15.5. experience. The discount rate is
higher than the rate of return on government obligations, reflecting the fsct
that future government receipts and expenditures are risky.' The estimates
9
also incorporate the mortality probabilities embedded in the Social Security—7—
Administration's projections of the US, population by age and sex. As
discussed in ACK (1991). the absolute value of the generational accounts is
sensitive to the choice of rates of discount and growth as well as rates of
birth and death. But for many of the questions of interest, such as the
fiscal burden being imposed on future generations relative to that being
shouldered by current generations, the results are quite robust to reasonable
departures from baseline assumptions.
As aentioned, inferring the fiscal burden on future generations requires
not only knowing the sumtotalof generational accounts of current
generations, but also the projected present value of the government's
expenditures on goods and services as well as the government's initial net
wealth position. As described in ACK (1991), the goverozaent'a net wealth is
estimated in e manner consiacent with the government sector deficit reported
in the National Income Accounts. The present value of government expenditures
is calculated by projecting current expenditures into the future taking into
account those expenditure elements which are sensitive to rhe demographic
structure. Fot example, our projections take into account the decline in per
capita spending on education that is likely to arise as the school—age
population declines relative to the total population.
Our baseline geoerational accounts reflect policy as of 1989 (prior to
the 1990 budget agreement). They show that a newborn male faced a net payment
to the government of $73,700, reflecting present values of $85,300 of tax
payments and $11,600 of transfers received. For females. the cueparable
figures are $36,400 in net present value, comprising $54700 in taxes and
$18,300 in transfers. The lower taxes for females priaarilyreflecttheir
lower rate of labor force participation, and hence lower income and payroll
taxes. The higher transfers reflect both greater female longevity and theconcentration of female—headed households in circumstances of poverty.
Together, Medicare and social security account for nearly half of all
transfers received by males, and over a third of those received by females.
Based on our estimates of initial government wealth and the projections
of the effects -of this baseline fiscal policy on existing generations, we find
that, as of 1989, generational policy wes out of balance in the sense that the
fiscal borden on future generations was 21 percent larger than that on 1989
male and female newborns, who are assumed to fall under the current policy
regime. As the net lifetime payments newborns are projected to make represent
almost 40 percent of their lifetime incomes, this imbalance in generational
policy translates into an added burden of nearly one tenth of the income of
members of future genererions.
An alternative way of measuring how far the current regime is out of
generational balance is the change in any particular fiscal instrument that
would be necessary to bring this 21 percent excess to zero —tomake the
"new" current policy sustainable without further adjuatment. Our calculations
suggest that an ieunediare and permanent increase in the average income tax
rate of 5.3 percent (just under 1 percentage point) would suffice. If,
instead, payroll taxes wore used to equalize the burden, they'd have to rise
by 7.8 percent, or about i percentage point. Alternatively, a rise in sales
taxes of 10,2 percent (just over 1 percentage point) or a 14.3 percent rise
(nearly 4 percentage points) in capital income taxes would be required.
While any of these fiscal inatrunents (or many others) could be used to
provide intergenerational balance, each policy change would lead to a
different burden on currenr sod future generations. The most favorable to che
young end future generations are sales taxes, more ot which would be paid by
older individuals. At the other extrcmc, not surprisingly, are payroll taxes.—9—
Hence, generational balance iay be achieved with a range of lapacts on
particular generations
IV. Generational Accounting and Deficits
The usefulness of generational accounting is immediately clear when one
compares the effects of specific fiscal polices on deficits and generational
accounts. Policies that change the pattern of generational burdens need not
affect the deficit, while other policies say change the deficit without
affecting the pattern of generational burdens. This is illustrated by Table 1
(reprinted from AGK 1992), which present simulations of the effects of four
different, but not unusual, policies.
The first of these policies is a five—year, 20 percent reduction in the
average federal income tax rate, with the tax rate increased above its initial
value after five years to maintain s constant dcbt—to—GNP ratio. This policy
would raise the deficit and shift the fiscal burden to young and future
generations —nota surprising result. However, the second policy —an
immediate and permanent 20 percent increase in social security retirement sod
disability benefits financed on a pay—as—you—go basis by increases in payroll
taxes —wouldinduce a quite similar shifting of fiscal burdens without any
change in the time path of measured deficits (including or excluding the
social security system). The third policy involves an equal revenue switch in
tax structure —aperosnent 30 percent cut in payroll taxes financed by
increased sales taxes —which,again, shifts generational burdens without
changing the deficit.
The final policy illustrated in Table 1 involves the elimination of the
discount that presontly exists in the price of existing assets as a result of
investment incentives. Removing this distount (as would be sccosiplished by—10-.
extending the tax treatment of new assets to existing assets) is essentially a
windfall grant tc owners of existing capital. We assume in rho simulation
that this grant is paid for by a pernanent increase in capital income tax
rates, a policy shift that transfers resources from the young (who, on
average, have not yet accumulated significant wealth) to the old (who, on
average, have).
As the simulations in this section indicate, the generational effects of
a variety of realistic policies can not be determined by looking at deficits.
We turn now io an exasiinstion of several social security and Medicare policies
which may actually be adopted through time.
V. The Generational Impacts of Social Poiiciea
A. Social Security's GASDI Program
We first consider policies to alter the structure of the CASDI (non
Medicare) portion of the social security system. As a result of the increases
in payroll taxes mandated by the l93 changes. this program has in recent
years been running large cash flow surpluses of roughly 100 billion dollars
per year. While these sccuaulstions were planned to help offset benefit
payments in the decades to come, their existence, combined with historically
high payroll tax rates, has lent force to arguments for reducing payroll
taxes. However, cutting payroll taxes is not, in itself, a full description
of a fiscal policy payroll tsx cuts alone would cause a violation of the
government's fiscal balance requirement. A complete policy specification also
requires a compensating change either in net gcvernment receipts or spending
(or both) .Thissertion presents siculaticus ior foot such policies and their
effects on the fiscal burdens of different gonoratinns.—l1—
The first of the four polities considered is a proposal to cut the social
security payroll tax rate over the next three decades and to increase the tax
rate thereafter. Thesecondpolicy involves the same reduction in payroll
taxes (through the year 2020) as in the first simulation, but rather than
raise tax rates after 2020, this policy reduces social security benefits
beginning in that year by the same amount that payroll taxes would otherwise
have increased, The third policy entails the indirect dissipation of the
social eecurity trust fund though an increase in government spending over the
next three decades equal, on an annual basis, to the social security surplus.
Over these decades funds to pay for the increased government spending are
"harrowed' so that in 2020 the additional accumulated federal debt is equal in
megnitude to the social security trust fund. The fourth policy is an
immediate and permanent switch from psyroll tax finance to income tax finance
of social security.
The first column of Table 2 indicates what reducing and then increasing
payroll taxes will do to the burdens placed on different generations. The
policy provides windfalls to Americans currently alive, with the exception of
the very old and the very young. Those currently aged 30 to 40 receive the
largest windfalls, roughly $3,000 for males and $1,500 for females, These
gsina tome at the expense of children currently uoder age 10 as well as future
individuals, if all future Americans are treated uniformly, up to the growth
adjustment, their lifetime net payments will rise by $6,100, in the case of
males and $3,000, in the case of females.
Enactment of a policy that promises to raise future taxes to pay for
current tax cuts doesn't ensure that such taxes will actually be raised. The
government might use an alternative method to restore fiscal balance. For
example, the necessary increase in net payments eight take the form of a cut—1 2—
it-i social security benefits. Such a policy, depicted in the second column of
Table 2, reduces by about one third for males and by about two thirds for
females the gains enjoyed under the initial policy. Feuiales lose relstively
more because their share of social security benefits is larger than is their
share of payroll tax payments.
Thethird column in Table 2shows what hsppeos if the federal goverronent
indirectlydissipatesthe social security surplus by raising its spending
beyond the amount projected in the haseline generational eccouots. In the
simulation, the government continues to accumulate its social security trust
fund, but it also borrows to pay for additional spending with the annual
amount of the borrcwing equal in size to the snnual social security surplus.
We assume this process of deficit—financed increased spending continues
through 2020, and that after 2020 the government taises income taxes to pay
interest less an adjustment for growth on the additional accumulated official
debt.
This policy has quite different effects from those in the previous
simulations, since, unlike policies that do not change direct government
spending, increases in government spending nay eventuate in an increase the
ansi of all generational accounts, Mere, this added burden is borne by all
generations who will be alive to service the extra debt, with the greatest
burden on those currently young and those yet to be born. Mow this translates
into the net impact on each generation depends on the size and distribution of
the benefits of the added spending. Certainly if the benefits are spread over
only those currently alive, the unborn will lose,
the final siauletinn in Table 2 shows the effects of a change in the
method of financing social security benefits. Over the years some have argued
that the connection between payroll taxes and 04301 benefits is sufficiently—13—
weakthat there is little reason to rely on the payroll tax as a source of
finance. The policy change considered here would replace the payroll tax with
the income tax as the method of fiesnce, immediately andperLilanencly. While
such a change has been advocated for a variety of reasons, including a desire
to use a more progressive source of revenue, our simulation considers only the
generational effects of the switch. We find that those under forty stand to
win, and those over forty stand to lose, because incomeraxesare levied on
incoee from assets as well as income from labor, and older individuals receive
a bigger share of asset income than labor incoee.
The generational implications of using general revenue finance to pay
for social security are spelled out in the last column of Table 5. On
average. 60—year—old males and females would be forced topay$9,600 and
$5,600 more, respectively. Forty year—old males and females would suffer
respective losses of $4,400 end $1,300. In contrast, asles and females who
are now sge 10 would benefit by more than $3.000 each. The policy would also
represent more than a $2,000 lifetime net payment break to future generations.
In sumleary. the results in this table show that one cannot simply analyze
the effects of a cut in payroll taxes —itis necessary to specify what
replaces these taxes. The simulations suggest four possible routes: increased
payroll taxes in the future, reduced benefits in the future, reductions in
government spending, and replacement with income taxes. Each lies its own
effects on the generational fiscal burden.
B. l4edieare Policy
Many observers have worried about the rising level of hoalth care costs
in the United States, which spends a much larger fraction of UN? on health
care than any other OFCD country. After the United States. Canada is the'-14—
country with the highest per capita health care spending, but the Canadians
spend almost 30 percent less per person. At present, about 12 cents of every
dcllar of U.S. output goes to health care, coopared with S cents in 1960. By
the turn of the century the figure is projected to be 17 cents. And if the
growth of health care is unabated, the figure will reach 37 cents hy the year
2030 (see Darman 1991).
What explains the rapid growth in real per capita U.S. health
expenditures? Since 1960 slightly over half of the growth simply reflects
expanded use of health care services and facilities. Another third of the
growth is due to the price of medical care rising relative to the prices of
cther goods and services, And the remaining 11 or so percent of health
expenditure growth reflects the aging of the population. This aging of
America will, of course, intensify in the years ahead.
The growth of health care expenditures hss potentially enormous
implications for government outlays and the well—being oi different
generations. Consider just rho federal government expenditure's on Medicaro.
Those payments currently ccnstiture 7 percent of Ictal federal outlays.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, Medicare is projected to
exceed 30 percent of the federal budget by 2025. To support Medicare at its
current levels alone, either the federal budget would have to grow iar beyond
its current level of about 20 percent of CNP or the rest of the budget would
have to decline by more than 20 percent in real cores.
If Medicare's growth is not curtailed, how will its additional costs be
financed? Civen its cash—flow accounting, Medicare, like CASDI, will be
reporting cash—flow surpluses over stoat of this decade as the 1-13 (hemlth
insurance) component of payroll taxes grows. But by the end of the decade the
higher payroll tax receipts will fall short of rho increased Medicare—1 5—
spending,leading, in abort order, to the exhaustion of the Medicare Truat
Fund.
If and when the HI trust fund is dissipated, the government cay raise
payroll taxea, or may aimply "bortow" from the GASI (Old Age Survivor
Insurance) and DI (Disability Insurance) Social Security trust funds.
Incerfund social security borrowing has occurred in the paat, and would delay
the -eventual need to raiae payroll taxes, possibly until the burden of these
higher taxes fell primarily on generations not yet born, According to
Medicare's actuaries, the HI payroll tax may have to rise by anywhere from 6
to 16 percentage points. Since the combined employer—employee social security
payroll tax is currently just over 15 percent, the untnhihited growth of
Medicare expenditures could eventually require s doubling of social security
taxes,
The generaiional accounts considered thus far were based on the
assumption <perhaps naive) that medical expenditures will grow no faster than
the rest of the economyIn light of the past growth of Medicare, Table 3
considers two alternative growth rates for Medicare expenditures over the
1990's. In the table Medicare outlays in the 1990's ore assumed to grow at
either a 2 or 4 percent higher rate than the rest of the economy. After the
rorn of the century the Medicare growth rate is assumed to equal the economy-.
wide growth rate. The 2 and 4 percent growth rates bracket the 2.77 rate of
growth of health spending in excess of 091' observed botween 1960 and 1969.
The 4 percent -growth rate is consistent with projections of sc iccresse, over
the decade, from 12 to 17 percent in the share of U.S. hcaith care spending
relative to ON?.
For each growth rate there are three alternative financing scenarios.
The first is that futute generations pick up the entire bill for this decade's—16—
projected higher Medicare growth. The second is that the growth in Medicare
over the next decade is ultimately paid for by a reduction in Medicare
benefits starting in the year 2020. The third is that this decade's growth in
Medicare is matched, on an annual basis, with increases in HI payroll taxes.
The three scenarios have markedly different implications fur both living
end unborn generations. Under the first scenario, the burden is entirely
shifted onto future generations; all living generations benefit froa the
growth in Medicare, because they don't have to pay for it. Depending on the
growth rate assumed, future generations end up paying from 10 to 23 percent
sore than in the base case. If Medicare growth is 4 percent, the absolute
increase in the bill handed cur male descendants is $19,400; it is $9,000 for
our female descendants. These additional burdens raise substantially the
ratio of totai net payments of the unborn to those of newborns. Rather than
paying 21 percent more then newborns, future generations in the 4 percent
growth scenario, end up paying almost 50 percent more than newborne!
The second scenario given in columns 2 and 5, indicates what happens
if, instead of borrowing from the Social Security Trust Fund, Medicare pays
for its prospective near—term generosity with longer—term (after 2020) benefit
cuts.In this case, individuals below age 50 lose, because of the net cuts in
Medicare benefits in their retirement. Note also that today's older
individuals experience the same large gains from Medicare growth as in the
previous financing scenario for the simple reason that, by assumption, the
projected Medicate benefit cuts don't begin for 30 years.
The third financing sechanisie, which involves annual incteases in NI
payroil taxes to pay for the excess Medicare growth is explored in Columns 3
and 6. This scenario hurts so even larger fraction of thoee alive, but has
the smallest effect on members of future generations, whose net payments rise—17—
by toughly the same proportion as those for individuals age 30 and under. As
in the previous cases, members of older generations, who have essentially
retired and ceased paying payroll taxes, enjoy roughly the same gain from the
near—term growth in Medicare.
Given the persistent growth of health care costs, one night ask how eiuch
more extreme ihese results would be if Medicare spending grew as a share of
GNP not for the next decade but, say, for the next three decades, We repeated
the simulations in table 3 under the assumption that Medicare grows at a rate
2% or 4% faster than GNP until 2020. Not surprisingly, the burden on future
generations grows considerably under these assumptions, hut the extent of this
growth depends on the policy being simulated.If Medicare costs rise ,st a
rate 2% faster than GNP and benefits ace eventually cut (in 2020), the added
burden on future males would rise from $3,300 to $12.aoo; that on females from
$1,800 to $6,000. At the other extreme, the "worst case" scenario is when
Medicare grows at m 4% faster rate until 2020, end only future geoerations
pay. In this case, the added burden on future males rises from $19,400 to
$62,100; that on females from $9,000 ro $26,200. Given that our baseline
aimulatioos assign future males and females total fiscal burdens of $89,500
and $44,200, respectively, we see that sustained Medicare growth has the
pocenriai.of absorbing a significant share of the government's overall budget,
VI. Conclusion
We have estimated that America's policy path, based on current law and
the assumption of balanced growth in gevetreeont spending, will place a roughly
21 percent larger growth—adjusted net tax burden on future generations than it
will place on Americans who have recently been horn, Rut ibis estimate is
based on what may be relativoly optimistic assumptions: that the social—18—
security system's projected cash—flow surpluses will continue to accumulate
and that Medicate spending will imseediately stabilize as a share of ONE'.
Those individuals coming in the future as well aa todays infants and young
children could end up paying considerably more under less uptioistic but
realistic alternative paths for sociai security and Medicare policies.
Specifying a different path for payroll taxes or Medicare costs is not
enough to describe an alternative fiscal policy: one must also indicate how
the government will compensate for either of these changes in order to
preserve intertesiporal fiscal balance. Though we know some balancing response
must occur, the ultimate path cannot, of course ba known with certainty —we
have considered several alternatives in each case.
The social security policies we have analyzed include ahort—term payroll
tax cuts financed by long—term payroll tax increases, future benefit cuts, or
general revenue finance, as wall as the dissipation of the iapanding social
sacurity "off—budget" surpluses through increased "on—budget" deficits. Our
simulations for Medicare consider alternative responaes to the continued
growth of Medicare expenditures as a share of ONF. The use of generational
accounting reveals, as deficit accounting cannot, the relative burdens that
these different policy responses place on different generations.—19—
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Table1
Changes in Generational Accounts Arising
from Four Hypothetical Policies
(present value, thousandsofdollars)
20 Percent Shifting from Eliminating
5Year Social SecurityPayroll to Sales Investusent
TaxCutBenefit In.creaandExcise Taxes Incentives
Main
Ages
0 1.9 2.7 1.0 0.9
10 3.2 3.9 —1.3 1.5
20 2.2 5.5 —6,5 2.3
30 —0.3 5.2 —8.8 2.1
—2.7 2.4 —7.5 0,2
50 —4.4 —2.7 —3.9 —2.5
60 —5.0 —10.2 0.7 —4.7
70 —2.6 —11.9 3.4 —5.0
80 —1.6 —7.3 2.8 —4.0
Future
Generations1.9 3.1 0.4 0,2
Ages
0 1.0 1.0 3.5 0.4
10 1.7 1.5 3.2 0.6
20 0.7 1.9 1.5 0.8
30 —0.2 0,9 1.8 1.2
40 —1.0 —1.0 2.4 0.6
50 —1.9 —4.5 3.1 —0.5
60 —2.1 —10.0 3,9 —1.8
70 —1.5 —11.0 3.9 —2.4
60 —0.9 —7.5 2.8 —2.4
Future
Generations1.0 1.1 3,8 0.1—21—
Table2
Changes in Generational Accounts from Four Social Security Policies
(present value thousands of dollars)
Immediate Payroll Immediate Payroll Dissipating Switching
Tax Cuts Tax Cuts the from Payroll
Financed by Financed by Social Security to Income
Future Tax Increags Benefit Reductions Trust Fund Tax Finanne
Males
Ages
0 1.3 0.3 4.1 —2.4
10 —0.2 —0.6 4.0 —3.6
20 —2.3 —1.8 2.9 —4.4
30 —3.4 —2,2 1.5 —1.0
40 —3.2 —2.5 0.6 4.4
50 —2.0 —1.8 0.2 8.4
60 —0,7 —0.? 0 9.6
70 —0,1 —0.1 0 7.7
80 0 0 0 4.5
Future
Generations 6.1 3.8 5.2 —2.5
Females
Ages
0 0.6 0.4 1.9 —2.0
10 —0.3 —0.1 1,9 —3.1
20 —1.4 —0.6 1.5 —4.7
30 —1.7 —0.5 0.9 —2.0
40 —1.5 —0.6 0.4 1.3
50 —1.0 —0.5 0.1 4.2
60 —0.4 —0.4 0 5.6
10 0 0 0
so 0 0 0 2.2
Future
Generations 3.0 2.2 2.4 —2.2—22—
Table3
Changes in Generational Accounts from Medicare Policies
(present valne thousands of dollars)
2 Percent Growth Rate 4 Percent Gxuwch Rate
Future Eventual Pay—As— Future Eventual Pay—As
Generations Medicare You—Go Generations Medicare You—Co
Pay Benefit CutFinance Rev Lenef it Cut Finance
Ages
0 —0.2 0.1 1.6 —0.5 0.3 3.4
10 —0.4 0.2 2.1 —0.9 0.5 4.6
20 —0.6 0.4 2.3 —1.4 0.8 4.9
30 —1.0 0.7 1.6 —2.2 1.6 3.6
40 —1.6 0.1 0.4 —3.5 0.1 0.7
50 —2.1 —1,9 —1.6 —5.9 —4.2 —3.5
60 —4.2 —4.2 —3.9 —9.2 —9.2 —8.5
70 —3.6 —3.6 —3.5 —7.7 —7.7 —7.5
80 —2.0 —2.0 —2.0 —4.3 —4.3 —4.3
Future
Generations8.9 3.3 2.0 19.4 7.1 4.3
Females
Ages
0 —0.3 0.2 0.7 —0.7 0.4 1.5
10 —05 0.3 0.9 —1.2 0,7 1,9
20 —0.8 0.5 0.7 —1.8 1.1 1.5
30 —1.3 0.9 0 —2.9 2.0 0
40 —2.1 0.3 —1.2 —4.7 0.6 —2.6
50 —3.5 —2.0 —3.0 —7.8 —4,5 —6,6
60 —5.5 —5.5 —5.3 —11.9 —11,9 —11.6
70 —4,9 —6.9 —4,9 —10.7 —10.7 —10.6
80 —2.9 —2.9 —2.9 —6.2 —6.2 —6.2
Future
Generations4.2 1,6 0,8 9.0 3.8 1.9-23—
As we discussed in our1991paper the appropriate discount rate to use
depends ontherisk characteristics of the flows being discounted. (A similar
point has been made by Bohn 1991). If government receipts and expenditures
were roughly proportional to aggregate fluctuations in income, then thn
private sector discount rate, measured by the real befote—tax rate of return,
would seem the appropriate discount rate to use. We use a somewhat lower rate
to reflect the existence of countercyclical government policy, in principal,
one would also discount separate cosponents of expenditures and net receipts
using different rates.
2Sec ACK (1992) for further discussion,